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Alternatives for an Arctic Treaty – Evaluation and a New Proposal 
 
 
 
This article examines alternative proposals for an Arctic treaty that have been put forward by 
scholars and international organisations. The numerous proposals on record draw their inspiration 
from various sources: chief among these is the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), but maritime 
regimes and even principles such as the common heritage of humankind are represented as well. 
The goal of the article is to examine the proposals in depth to ascertain what is viable and what is 
problematic in each. This analysis will aid in outlining a new treaty that can accommodate both the 
political realities in the Arctic and the societal goals pursued in the region. 
 
  
1. Introduction 
 
During the past twenty years, there has been a lively debate about the possibility of creating a legal 
co-operation mechanism for the Arctic region. A speech by the then-Secretary-General of the Soviet 
Union Mikhail Gorbachev in Murmansk in 1987 served to energise the discussion. The Soviet 
leader proposed in the spirit of glasnost, but still in the midst of the Cold War, that the Arctic States 
initiate cooperation in various fields, including protection of the environment.1 Even before this, the 
five Arctic range States of the polar bear had been able to conclude the Polar Bear Treaty in 1973,2 
which still serves as testimony to the possibility of Arctic States concluding a multilateral treaty if 
mutual concern is pressing enough. 
 
It was the protection of the environment that came to serve as the starting-point for Arctic-wide co-
operation between the eight Arctic countries (the Nordic States, the Soviet Union (now the Russian 
Federation), Canada and the US), first in the form of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy 
(AEPS) of 1991, and thereafter the Arctic Council, which was established in 1996. However, 
neither of these co-operation mechanisms was given legal form, and thus the search for a legal 
treaty continued. This endeavour has persisted because many have felt that the way the Arctic 
Council operates, in particular how it carries out its mandate of environmental protection, is not 
sufficient. Scientific studies suggest that the consequences of climate change may be twice as 
intense in the Arctic as in the rest of the world, and with the retreating sea ice and warming 
temperature, many are predicting a new economic development era in the Arctic, with increased 
                                              
1 For an analysis, see D.R. Rothwell, The Polar Regions and the Development of International Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), at 229-31. 
2 The 1973 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears(Oslo, 15 November 1973).   
shipping, hydrocarbon and mineral exploitation, etc., along with the related environmental risks.3 It 
would seem clear that with its current weak institutional structure, soft-law status and ad hoc 
funding system, there is not much the Arctic Council can do to ensure that this development is 
sustainable. Scholars and organizations have pursued the idea of finding new teeth for the Council 
by transforming it via an Arctic treaty, drawing on the experience from various regimes and 
governance arrangements functioning in the international sphere.  
 
This article aims to examine alternative visions for an Arctic treaty proposed by scholars and 
organisations and to draw lessons from these proposals to recommend a proposal for a treaty that 
would be viable, taking into account both the political realities present and the societal goals being 
pursued in the Arctic. First, it is important to sketch in a general manner the various alternatives 
propounded by scholars and organisations for an Arctic treaty. It will become apparent in the 
following pages that the Arctic is not only a place for imagination in general, but also a source of 
inspiration for legal innovation as testified by the numerous and diverse suggestions for an Arctic 
treaty. These alternative models will then be analysed in the concluding section from the viewpoint 
of their viability. An attempt will also be made to identify one possible way to design an Arctic 
treaty in a general way, which, at least for the present author, seems a viable one. Before that, 
however, it is crucial to examine the present governance system of the Arctic in order to evaluate 
the suitability of the various alternatives for an Arctic treaty and give the basis for the argument for 
the best alternative.  
 
2. An Extremely Complex System of Governance in the Arctic 
 
Before discussing the prevailing governance system in the Arctic, it is pertinent to try to define the 
precise area that constitutes the Arctic. The question of where the southernmost boundary of the 
Arctic should be drawn is complicated, since several different criteria can be presented. Possible 
natural boundaries are, for instance, the tree line (i.e., the northernmost boundary where trees grow) 
or the 10oC isotherm (i.e., the southernmost location where the mean temperature of the warmest 
month of the year is below 10oC). In Arctic-wide co-operation, the Arctic Circle has been used as a 
                                              
3 For a recent warning of this type, see ‘Drawing Lines  in Melting Ice’, The Economist  (18 August , 2007), 47 
criterion for membership: only States possessing areas of territorial sovereignty above the Arctic 
Circle have been invited to participate.4  
 
2.1. Legal Status of the Arctic 
 
Within this approximate region, all the levels of law - international law, European law and national 
legal systems - come into play, as much of the region falls under the sovereignty and sovereign 
rights of the eight Arctic States. Sovereignty has been established over all land areas by the eight 
Arctic States, but a large portion of the Arctic waters falls within these States’ Exclusive Economic 
Zones (EEZs) or continental shelves. Taking a closer look, we can identify three federal States (the 
US, Canada and Russia), with varying kinds of mandates accorded to their sub-administrative units 
(the State of Alaska, the northern territories of Canada, and the various entities of the Russian 
Federation), wherein indigenous peoples have been given different powers and rights. Finland, 
Sweden and Denmark are Member States of the EU, but since Denmark’s Greenland chose not to 
become part of the EU, it possesses extensive autonomous powers in the form of home-rule. Iceland 
and Norway, which are members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA),  are bound by 
considerable European law as parties to the European Economic Area Agreement,5 with the 
exception of the Svalbard Islands, which was excluded from the EEA agreement by a special 
Protocol6 due to its unique status established through an international treaty in 1920.7 The eight 
States of the region have committed themselves to a large number of international treaties and are, 
of course, also bound by customary international law.8  
 
All of the land area - continents as well as islands – is firmly under the sovereignty of the Arctic 
States, and the Arctic waters now largely fall under their exclusive maritime jurisdiction.9 The core 
                                              
4 Iceland also has areas of territorial sovereignty above the Arctic Circle, as its territorial sea extends above the Circle. 
For an analysis of the various definitions, see T. Koivurova, Environmental Impact Assessment in the Arctic: A Study of 
International Legal Norms (Ashgate, 2002), at 25-28. 
5 Agreement on the European Economic Area, [1994] O.J. L1/494. 
6 Ibid. A special Protocol was adopted as part of the EEA Agreement to the effect that Norway may decide whether to 
apply the EEA Agreement to Svalbard or not (Protocol 40). Norway decided to exclude the Islands. See Ulfstein, Geir, 
[PLEASE INCLUDE THEIR FIRST INITIALS] The Svalbard Treaty: From Terra Nullius to Norwegian Sovereignty 
(Scandinavian University Press, 1995), at 299.  
7 Treaty Relating to Svalbard (Paris, 9 February 1920)   
8 For a good overview of the governance framework in the Arctic, see Arctic Human Development Report(Stefansson 
Arctic Institute, 2004), especially Chapters 5 and 6. 
9 One exception is tiny Hans Island between Greenland and Canada’s Ellesmere Island over which both Canada and 
Denmark assert sovereignty; thus it was left out of the maritime boundary delimitation agreement between the two 
countries. For an analysis, see M. Carnaghan and A. Goody, Canadian Arctic Sovereignty;Challenges to Canada’s 
of the Arctic Ocean remains part of the high seas as well as some holes encircled by the EEZs of 
Arctic coastal States.10 The deep sea-bed is governed by the International Sea-Bed Authority11, 
although some Arctic States are developing claims to the Commission on the Limits of Continental 
Shelf to extend their continental shelf to deep sea-bed ridges of the Arctic Ocean floor.12 There are 
also on-going and potential future disputes concerning the location of some of the maritime borders, 
especially those between Canada and the US in the Beaufort Sea, and Russia and Norway in the 
Barents Sea, although in general it can be noted that the Arctic States have resolved their maritime 
boundary disputes peacefully through negotiations, conciliation and judicial procedures.13 With 
such a complex framework of governance it is no wonder that the actual Arctic-wide co-operation 
process, a short overview of which will now be provided, has started with a soft-law approach, 
enabling us to view the Arctic as a distinct political region.14  
 
2.2. Arctic Co-operation 
 
The first stage of Arctic-wide co-operation started with the 1991 AEPS. In the Strategy, six high-
priority environmental problems facing the Arctic were first identified (persistent organic 
contaminants, radioactivity, heavy metals, noise, acidification and oil pollution), international 
environmental protection treaties that apply in the region were identified, and, finally, specific 
actions to counter the threats were laid out. As part of the environmental protection action by the 
eight Arctic States, four environmental protection working-groups were established: Conservation 
of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), 
                                                                                                                                                        
Arctic Sovereignty, c. Hans Island, Canadian Library of Parliament, Political and Social Affairs Division (PRB05-61E, 
26 January 2006), available at <http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/prb0561-e.htm>. 
10 These are the so-called Banana Hole in the Norwegian Sea, the Barents Sea Loophole, and the Bering Sea Doughnut 
Hole. 
11 The International Sea-bed Authority was established by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and 
the Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the Convention. See United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (Montego Bay, 10 December 1982) (‘UNCLOS’); and Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI 
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [PLEASE STATE THE DOCUMENT NUMBER, FULL 
DATE AND CITY WHERE IT WAS SIGNED], Article 156. The deep sea-bed authority governs the deep sea-bed (the 
so called Area, the ocean bottom beyond the continental shelf’s of the coastal states) on behalf of the humankind. 
12 See the various submissions to the Commission on the Limits of Continental Shelf by the Russian Federation in 2001 
and Norway in 2006, and reactions to these by other States, on the Commission’s website at 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/clcs_home.htm>. 
13 For an analysis, see T. Koivurova, Environmental Impact Assessment in the Arctic: A Study of International Legal 
Norms (Ashgate, 2002), at 56-64. The most recent was the conclusion of an Agreement between the Government of the 
Kingdom of Norway on the one hand, and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark together with the Home Rule 
Government of Greenland on the other hand, concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf and the fishery zones 
in the area between Greenland and Svalbard (Copenhagen, 20 February 2006). 
14 This argument has been made by Oran Young. See O. Young, ‘The Structure of Arctic Cooperation: Solving 
Problems/Seizing Opportunities’ (paper prepared at the request of Finland in preparation for the Fourth Conference of 
Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, Rovaniemi, 27-29 August 2000)available at 
<http://www.arcticparl.org/?/report/ReportID/8>. 
Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR), and the Arctic Monitoring and 
Assessment Programme (AMAP). Three ministerial meetings (following the signing of the 
Declaration and the Strategy) were held in this first phase of Arctic co-operation, generally referred 
to as ‘AEPS co-operation’.15 
 
The establishment of the Arctic Council in 1996 broadened the mandate of the co-operation to all 
common issues facing the Arctic (excluding matters related to military security), especially those 
relating to environmental protection and sustainable development. The four environmental 
protection working-groups of the Strategy were integrated into the structure of the Council, and one 
new working-group was established (the Sustainable Development Working-Group (SDWG)). In 
the absence of a permanent secretariat, the work of the Arctic Council is heavily influenced by the 
priorities that the chair-State lays out for its two-year chair period, at the end of which a ministerial 
meeting is organized. Senior Arctic Officials (SAO), a group of high-level officials, guides the 
work of the Council in between the ministerial meetings. The Arctic Council has also adopted new 
programmes related to environmental protection, such as the Arctic Council Action Plan to 
Eliminate Pollution in the Arctic (ACAP), which was recently turned into a sixth working-group,16 
and the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA). One unique aspect in the Arctic Council is the 
role it gives to the region’s indigenous peoples: they are normally accorded the status of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) in different inter-governmental organisations and forums, but 
the Arctic Council defines them as permanent participants, a distinct category of membership 
between members proper and observers, whom the Arctic Council member States must consult 
prior to any consensus decision-making. The group of observers is large, and consists of inter-
governmental and non-governmental organisations as well as States that are active in the Arctic 
region.17 
 
2.3. Formalising Arctic Management? 
 
The structure of Arctic governance thus seems extremely complex. Since the region hosts such a 
wide variety of governance arrangements, this has enabled scholars and organisations to come up 
with a wide variety of proposals for an Arctic treaty. Yet, it has to be borne in mind that since it is a 
very complex governance system, it will not be easy to come up with an overarching legal regime 
                                              
15 For a recent analysis, see T. Koivurova and D. VanderZwaag, ‘The Arctic Council at 10 Years: Retrospect and 
Prospects’, 40:1 UBC Law Review 40:1 (2007), 121, at  124-128. 
16 It was re-titled the Arctic Contaminants Action Program.  
17 For an analysis, see T. Koivurova and D. VanderZwaag, n. 15 above, at 128-159. 
for the whole region. David VanderZwaag et al. point to this complexity, and the fairly recent 
nature of Arctic-wide co-operation, arguing that in the near future formal approaches in Arctic 
governance seem unlikely.18 Olav Schram Stokke has suggested that ‘the best answer would seem 
to be a flexible approach to norm-building that seeks productive interplay with existing institutions’, 
by which he means, e.g., the interplay between the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS), the Arctic Council and other regional regimes, rather than aiming for an 
overarching legal regime, which, according to him, lacks political support from the Arctic States.19 
Hans Corell suggests that there already exists a legal regime functioning in the Arctic – the 
UNCLOS and the other treaties in force in the Arctic – and we should now focus on their 
implementation.20 Yet, he also argues that we need to examine whether the present regime needs 
strengthening, and, if so, political support for that purpose should be built up by ‘engaging the 
general public, business, politicians and governments’.21 
 
3. Inspiration from the Antarctic 
 
                                              
18 D. VanderZwaag, R. Huebert and S. Ferrara, ‘The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, Arctic Council and 
Multilateral Environmental Initiatives: Tinkering While the Arctic Marine Environment Totters’, [PLEASE STATE 
THE VOLUME AND ISSUE NUMBERS] Denver J. Intl L. & Policy (2002), 131, at 166-171. 
19 O. Schram Stokke, ‘The Law of the Sea Convention and the Idea of a Binding Regime for the Arctic Marine 
Environment’ (paper prepared for the 7th Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, Kiruna, Sweden, 2–4 
August 2006), available at <http://www.arcticparl.org/resource/images/Underlagsrapport%20eng-rysk3.pdf>. 
20 H. Corell, ‘Reflections on the Possibilities and Limitations of a Binding Legal Regime’, 37:4 Environmental Policy 
and Law (2007), 321.  
21 Ibid., at 324. 
Scholars and organizations looking for a new direction for the work of the Arctic Council have 
drawn on experience connected with the other pole, the Antarctic, and its well-established structures 
of governance. At first sight, this approach may seem misdirected, given that the two poles show 
more differences than similarities: the Arctic consists of ocean surrounded by continents, whereas 
the Antarctic is a continent surrounded by ocean; the Antarctic has no permanent human habitation, 
while the Arctic is inhabited by indigenous peoples and other local communities. Most profoundly, 
much of the Arctic is under the sovereignty and sovereign rights of the Arctic States, while 
Antarctic sovereignty claims have been frozen for the time being, and there are thus no territorial 
sovereigns in the Antarctic.22 
 
Yet, the two polar areas also resemble each other in many respects. Both have extreme climatic 
conditions that make it difficult to access the regions, they receive less radiation from the sun than 
other parts of the globe, and the ecosystems have had to adapt to very cold and dark environments 
with short but light growing seasons. In such conditions, the ecosystems are simple, containing only 
a few key species, and are thus more vulnerable to human-induced pollution than those of more 
temperate areas. Both areas are among the major regions for governmentally sponsored scientific 
research, and they face similar environmental challenges, such as the effect of global environmental 
problems and an increase in tourism.  
 
It is also important to stress that even though the differences between the two regions are enormous 
from the viewpoint of governance, we should not underestimate their similarity in the minds of the 
general public and human institutions. After all, regime formation is not always a rational process, 
and thus the imagined commonality of the poles may enable the polar regimes to draw lessons from 
each other, even in designing an Arctic treaty. In addition, in many countries, for one reason or 
another, polar issues are dealt with together, and many of the Arctic States (e.g., the US, Norway, 
Sweden, Finland and Russia) are also Consultative Parties to the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). 
Recently, the polar regimes themselves have started to monitor each other’s actions.23 The 
                                              
22 Yet, a number of countries still hold the view that they possess some sort of sovereignty in the Antarctic. See P. 
Vigni, ‘Antarctic Maritime Claims: “Frozen Sovereignty” and the Law of the Sea’, in O. Elferink and D.R. Rothwell 
(eds), The Law of the Sea and Polar Maritime Delimitation and Jurisdiction (Martinus Nijhoff, 2001). Recently, the UK 
government announced plans to claim sovereignty over a large area of the seabed around British portion of Antarctica, 
which then has provoked e.g. Chile to make a similar kind of announcement. See  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7052297.stm [PLEASE AUTHOR, TITLE AND DATE OF THE ARTICLE]  
23 Resolution 3 (2007) of the XXX Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting in New Delhi (11 May 2007), available at 
<http://30atcm.ats.aq/30atcm/Documents/Docs/fr/Atcm30_fr002_e.doc>, stated: ‘Long-term Scientific Monitoring and 
Sustained Environmental Observation in Antarctica. The Representatives…Noting that the Arctic Council Ministerial 
Meeting of 26 October 2005 [sic] urged all member countries of the Arctic Council to maintain and extend long-term 
monitoring of change in all parts of the Arctic as well as to create a coordinated Arctic observing network’. For an 
Salekhard Ministerial [WAS THIS A DECLARATION?] of the Arctic Council even went so far as 
to: 
 
Welcome the Edinburgh Declaration on the International Polar Year 2007-2008, 
adopted by the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting of 2006 proposing closer 
collaboration with the Arctic Council and request the SAOs to explore ways and 
means of promoting such collaboration. (original emphasis)24 
 
The most far-reaching argument made by some scholars is to borrow the idea of international 
community interest, present already in the Antarctic Treaty of 1959,25 and apply it to the Arctic. 
The ATS26 itself, even though not, strictly speaking, part of the common heritage of mankind 
(CHM),27 is open to any member State of the UN that conducts substantial research activity there.28 
This has not been enough for some developing States, who, for a number of years, challenged the 
ATS in the UN as a club of developed States and wanted to replace the ATS with a new regime 
which would apply the CHM principle.29 This debate has clearly also influenced scholars who have 
argued for a more representative regime to be established in the Arctic. One suggestion is to 
conclude an international agreement to maintain the area as a marine protected area, which could 
possibly be open to a few uses such as tourism and marine scientific research.30 Even a global treaty 
for the Arctic modelled on the ATS has been suggested since much of the region’s pollution 
problems presently originate from outside the Arctic.31 
                                                                                                                                                        
overview, see T. Koivurova, ‘Environmental Protection in the Arctic and Antarctic: Can the Polar Regimes Learn From 
Each Other?’, 33:2 International Journal of Legal Information (2005), 204. 
24 Available at http://www.arctic-
council.org/Meetings/Ministeral/2006/SALEKHARD_AC_DECLARATION_2006.pdf p.3.  [PLEASE STATE THE 
AUTHOR, TITLE, DOCUMENT NUMBER, FULL DATE. SIMPLY A WEBSITE CITE DOES NOT CONICIDE 
WITH THE STYLE USED IN RECIEL] 
25 The Preamble to the Antarctic Treaty recognises ‘that it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue 
for ever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international discord’. 
See Antarctic Treaty (Washington, 1 December 1959) , Preamble. 
26 The ATS is built on the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 and the inter-connected web of other treaties, of which only the 
1991 Environmental Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty (Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 
(Madrid, 4 October 1991)) is directly linked to the 1959 Treaty. The other treaties are the Convention on the 
Conservation of Marine Living Resources (Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
(CCAMLR) (Canberra, 20 May 1980)) and the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (Convention on the 
Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS) (London, 11 February 1972)).  
27 See J. Brunnée, ‘Common Areas, Common Heritage, and Common Concern’, in D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée and E. Hey 
(eds) The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, 2007), 550, at 563. 
28 See Antarctica Treaty, n. 25 above, Articles XIII and IX (2), which create two categories of members, those who do 
not conduct substantial research activity but have become parties (Non-Consultative Parties), and those who do 
(Consultative Parties) and thus have full rights to participate in Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings.   
29 See D.R. Rothwell, n. 1 above, at 451-452. 
30 See B. Hart Dubner, ‘On the Basis for the Creation of a New Method of Defining International Jurisdiction in the 
Arctic Ocean’, 13:1  Mo. Envtl L. & Pol’y Rev. (2005), 1. The author, however, unrealistically suggests extending a ‘no 
development’ zone to the baselines of the eight surrounding countries, which assumedly means territorial sea baselines.  
31 See M. A. Verhaag, ‘It Is Not Too Late: The Need for a Comprehensive International Treaty to Protect the Arctic 
Environment’, 15:4   Georgetown Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. (2003), 555.  
 A very important proposal that also borrowed some elements from the ATS was that advanced 
under the auspices of Canadian private research institutions and drafted by the pioneer of Arctic 
legal research Donat Pharand. This proposal for an ‘Arctic Region Council’ was even introduced by 
Canada at the 1991 ministerial meeting that adopted the AEPS as the starting-point of the initiative 
that culminated in the establishment of the Arctic Council.32 In contrast to the Arctic Council, the 
Arctic Region Council would have been adopted via an international treaty.  In its preamble in 
particular, it called attention to environmental protection and conservation, emphasising the 
importance of regional co-operation in developing the Arctic for peaceful purposes in the interest of 
all humanity, very much echoing the dedication of the Antarctic to peace, science and 
environmental protection in the Antarctic Treaty.33 Other similarities to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty 
can also be found. For instance, the proposed treaty’s scope of application is defined as being north 
of 60oC north latitude, which is the same latitude in the south that was used to define the Antarctic 
Treaty’s scope of application. 
 
In considering membership in the Arctic Region Council, the proposal makes a distinction between 
founding members and ‘Admitted Members’, manifesting somewhat the similar distinction in the 
ATS between Consultative Parties, which have full rights, and Non-Consultative parties, which 
have more limited rights. Yet, the similarities in terms of membership status between the Arctic 
Region Council proposal and the ATS are still quite far-reaching, given that the former envisages a 
regime that functions very much on the basis of the activity and decision-making of the eight Arctic 
States and the Arctic regional actors, while the ATS draws its member States from various 
geographical regions.34 The Arctic Region Council proposal calls for a plenary body called the 
Assembly consisting of all the members and a Commission with the eight founding members plus 
four elected Admitted members, the Assembly being responsible for discussing general policy 
                                              
32 See D.R. Rothwell, n. 1 above, at 242-244.  
33 D. Pharand, The ‘Draft Arctic Treaty: An Arctic Region Council Proposal’ (Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, 
[PLEASE STATE THE DATE] can be found at <http://www.carc.org/pubs/v19no2/5.htm>. 
34 See Antarctic Treaty, n. 25 above, Article 3, Membership, reads: ’The founding Members of the Council shall be the 
eight States whose territory projects north of the Arctic Circle…The admitted Members may be States, Governmental 
and Non-Governmental Organizations, territorial and regional governments. Such States, organizations, and 
governments are eligible for membership if they have demonstrated a substantial interest in the work of the Council and 
a capacity to further its purposes. Admission shall be decided by the Assembly upon the recommendation of the 
Commission. Commentary: To permit participation of all those with sufficient interest, the Council is open to 
membership of other States (such as France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom), organizations of States (such as the 
European Community), NGOs (such as the ICC [Inuit Circumpolar Conference])and territorial governments (such as 
Alaska, Yukon, N.W.T., Greenland) and regional governments (such as Chakotskiy, Nunavik and the Nordic Sami 
Council)’. At present, there are 45 States that are parties to the Antarctic Treaty, of which 27 are Consultative parties, 
with power to take part in decision-making in ATCMs. The Non-Consultative Parties can participate in ATCMs but do 
not have the right to take part in decision-making. 
orientation and the Commission for implementing these policies. A final clear similarity between 
the Arctic Region Council Proposal and the 1959 Antarctic Treaty is that the Arctic proposal 
envisages a review conference after the treaty has been in force for twenty-five years; the Antarctic 
Treaty stipulates that the review will take place after 30 years.35 
 
The direct possibility of borrowing some elements from the ATS to formalise Arctic co-operation 
has been well captured by Philippe Sands: 
 
The adoption of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy and the establishment 
of the Arctic Council provide a useful opportunity to develop new legal arrangements 
and institutions to govern an ecosystem which transcends national boundaries and 
requires international co-operation for its adequate protection to be assured. The soft 
law approach currently envisaged provides a first step; ultimately, it will be necessary 
to establish appropriate institutional arrangements and substantive rules, perhaps 
similar to those applied in the Antarctic, to ensure that agreed obligations are 
respected and enforced.36 (emphasis added) 
 
This kind of approach was adopted by the World Conservation Union (IUCN). According to Linda 
Nowlan, who did a study for the IUCN project on the topic, ideas could be borrowed from the more 
developed polar regime, the ATS, and especially the annexes to the 1991 Madrid Protocol.37 One 
possibility Nowlan outlines is to formalize Arctic co-operation through an international treaty. The 
treaty would contain principles, substantive legal obligations, and some innovative features that take 
into account the Arctic context, especially its indigenous peoples. The core of the proposal would 
be to have the five annexes to the Madrid Protocol - Impact Assessment, Conservation of Antarctic 
Flora and Fauna, Waste Disposal and Waste Management, Prevention of Marine Pollution, and 
Area Protection and Management38 - transposed to become the main substantive obligations of a 
potential Arctic regional treaty. Although Nowlan has put forward these possibilities, she also - and 
correctly - points out the problems in such an approach.39  
                                              
35 Ibid., Article XII (2a). 
36 P. Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law (2nd ed.) (Cambridge University Press, 2003), at 731. This 
can be contrasted with Gail Osherenko’s and Oran Young’s view, according to which ’simplistic comparisons between 
the Arctic and the Antarctic do more to confuse the analysis of prospects for international cooperation in the Arctic 
region than to shed light on this topic, See G. Osherenko and O. Young, The Age of the Arctic (Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), at 244.  
37 L. Nowlan, Arctic Legal Regime for Environmental Protection (IUCN Environmental Policy and Law Paper No. 44), 
Parts V and VI, available at <http://www.iucn.org/themes/law/info04.html>. 
38 A sixth annex, which had been stipulated in Article 16 of the Protocol, was adopted as Annex VI, Liability Arising 
From Environmental Emergencies, by the 28th ATCM in Stockholm on June 14, 2005; it is currently being ratified by 
the Consultative Parties. See the text at http://www.ats.aq/uploaded/ANNEXVI.pdf  [PLEASE STATE THE TITLE, 
DOCUMENT NUMBER SND FULL DATE OF THIS DOCUMENT] 
39 See L. Nowlan, n. 37 above, Part VI. Problems that she highlights include: (1) the time and expense of formal treaty 
negotiations could act as a barrier to continuation of soft law development; (2) a formal new organization, such as a 
 A recent interesting proposal to learn from one of the treaties forming the ATS had been advanced 
by Rosemary Rayfuse.40 According to her, the Arctic States could take advantage of the 
possibilities provided by the International Polar Year (IPY), which commenced in March 2007 and 
will run until March 2009.41 During this period, there will be enormous media attention focused on 
the polar areas, highlighting the common problems the two regions face, which will certainly 
increase the possibility of using Antarctic inspiration in the development of the Arctic Council. 
Rayfuse suggests that the 1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources (CCAMLR)42 could be used as a model for developing a comprehensive treaty regime 
for the Arctic Ocean, for areas that are beyond national jurisdiction. She suggests that ‘the treaty 
could also establish a regime responsible for the integrated and holistic management of all ocean-
related activities in the Arctic Ocean areas beyond national jurisdiction, including fishing, shipping, 
bioprospecting, scientific research and other matters relating to protection of the marine 
environment’.43 
 
4. Focusing on Arctic waters 
 
As the Arctic’s mostly ice-covered waters form a predominant part of what is usually considered to 
be the Arctic, it is no surprise that many proposals have been put forth for an Arctic co-operative 
regime focusing on Arctic waters. As is well known, the UNCLOS contains one article specifically 
tailored to Arctic, rather than Antarctic, conditions.44 Article 234 accords Arctic coastal States 
extended environmental protection powers within the limits of their exclusive economic zones if ice 
                                                                                                                                                        
treaty secretariat, could be expensive to operate; (3) a comprehensive regime can be difficult to obtain support for, and 
consequently difficult to implement - the best example of this phenomenon is UNCLOS, which took eleven years 
to from negotiation to coming into force, and is still not implemented worldwide; and (5) many international treaties are 
already taking the special needs of the Arctic into account such as the Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants 
(Stockholm, 22 May 2001) - pursuing Arctic specific goals in existing global regimes may be faster, less expensive, and 
more effective for the environment. 
40 R. Rayfuse, ‘Melting Moments: The Future of Polar Oceans Governance in a Warming World’, 16:2 RECIEL (2007), 
196.. 
41 This International Polar Year (IPY) will be the fourth of its kind, the most recent being organized fifty years ago 
(1957-1958). It is not a single year but a two-year period loosely corresponding to the two years mentioned in the name 
(2007-2008). The fourth IPY will start in March 2007 and end by March 2009 to allow for two summer field seasons at 
both poles. See generally  <http://www.ipy.org/>.  
42 See  CCAMLR, n. 26 above. 
43 See R. Rayfuse, n. 40 above, at 216. 
44 For a view from a scholar who took part in the UNCLOS negotiations, see K. Hakapää, ‘Vessel-Source Pollution in 
the UN Law of the Sea Convention: Some Assessment as of Today’, Liber Amicorum Bengt Broms: Celebrating His 
70th Birthday (16 October 1999) (PMS Print Oy Helsinki, 1999), 97 at 113-116.  
is present in an area for most of the year.45 This led the Arctic Council to develop special 
navigational rules for the Arctic waters, which were later adopted as a non-binding International 
Maritime Organization’s (IMO) Polar Code.46   
 
Given the ‘constitutional’ nature of the UNCLOS, which for the most part codifies the present law 
of the sea, it is no wonder that scholarly suggestions have focused on how to apply this Convention 
to the very particular circumstances prevailing in the Arctic region, although there are also 
proposals which argue that special rules should apply to the Arctic waters47 or which have 
suggested the possibility of finding inspiration in other regional sea governance arrangements 
functioning in different parts of the world.48 One scholarly debate has centred on the question of 
whether the Arctic Ocean should be regarded as a semi-enclosed sea as defined in Article 122 of the 
UNCLOS. If it were so classified, the littoral States would have greater obligations to cooperate in 
regard to environmental protection.49 Another possibility would be to conclude an Arctic 
convention, which could be supplemented by protocols basing themselves on the UNCLOS.50 
 
A more concrete proposal has been laid out by the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), which has 
observer status in the Arctic Council. In a seminar hosted by Arctic parliamentarians on 28 
November 2005, WWF laid out one of the first concrete, albeit preliminary, proposals for an Arctic 
                                              
45 UNCLOS, n. 11 above, Article 234 reads: ‘Ice-covered areas. Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-
discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-
covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions and the 
presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and 
pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. 
Such laws and regulations shall have due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment based on the best available scientific evidence’. These criteria are largely overlapping since if ice is 
present in an area for most of the year, the other conditions are normally also fulfilled. 
46 The 1998 Iqaluit meeting of the Arctic Council gave a mandate to the PAME working group to assess current and 
potential shipping activities in the Arctic in light of what, if any, additional Arctic shipping measures were required. 
This included working on an International Code of Safety for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code) under the 
auspices of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), which eventually lead the IMO to adopt these as Guidelines 
for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-Covered Water (IMO MSC/Circ. 1056, MEPC/Circ. 399, 23 December 2002). 
47 See D.M. Johnston, ‘The Future of the Arctic Ocean: Competing Domains of International Public Policy’, 17 Ocean 
Yearbook (2003), 596, at 600-602. For a very early proposal to this effect, see W. Lakhtine, ’Rights Over the Arctic’, 24 
American Journal of International Law (1930), 703-717. 
48 See T. Koivurova and D. VanderZwaag, n. 15 above, at 180-183. 
49 See UNCLOS, n. 11 above, Article 122, reads: ‘For the purposes of this Convention, “enclosed or semi-enclosed sea” 
means a gulf, basin or sea surrounded by two or more States and connected to another sea by a narrow outlet or 
consisting entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal states’. There 
is a wide outlet from the Arctic Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean at the Greenland Sea, and this outlet is not within the EEZs 
of the coastal States. For a view that the Arctic Ocean cannot be classified as a semi-enclosed sea, see E. J. Harders, ‘In 
In Quest for an Arctic Legal Regime: Marine Regionalism – A Concept of International Law Evaluated’, 11:4  Marine 
Policy (1987), 285-298. For a recent argument, see D. Pharand, ‘The Arctic Waters and the Northwest Passage: A Final 
Revisit’, 38:1/2 Ocean Development and International Law (Jan-Jun 2007), 3-69. 
50 D. Brubaker, Marine Pollution and International Law (Belhaven Press, 1993), 294-432. 
treaty. Its idea was to first establish a preparatory commission under the auspices of the Arctic 
Council to conclude an ambitious nature protection treaty. WWF envisages the substantive content 
of the treaty as being based on already existing standards found in the UNCLOS, the Straddling 
Stocks Convention51 and the Polar Code. The WWF proposal includes the following policy areas as 
the key regulative content for a treaty that would apply beyond the national maritime jurisdiction: 
creating a network of marine protected areas and special management areas, including a stronger set 
of regulations for the construction and operation of ships increasingly operating in Arctic waters; 
and the basing of fishery management policies on the UN Straddling Stocks Agreement. The WWF 
treaty proposal also includes ecosystem-based management modeled on CCAMLR, as also 
suggested by Rayfuse, and regional standards to reduce the risk of transboundary effects of oil 
spills, as well as the development of an international means to respond to oil spills. 
 
The WWF proposal also envisages a structure to supervise and develop the treaty, based firmly on 
the existing structure of the Arctic Council with respect to membership categories and decision-
making. Furthermore, the role of technical/scientific advice and monitoring is very similar to that 
which already exists in the Council, especially in the AMAP programme, but more integrated in 
character. A more controversial proposal was to have the new agreement contain a dispute-
resolution clause, but one that would have excluded territorial disputes from its ambit. This 
preliminary proposal does not elaborate on the relationship between the agreement and the Arctic 
Council, but as it seemingly would take on almost all of the Arctic Council’s present tasks, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the proposed structure would replace the Council, although questions 
remain as to how the Arctic Council’s current sustainable development mandate would fit in with 
this proposal. 52 [PLEASE ADD A LINE STATING HOW STATES HAVE RESPONDED TO 
THIS WWF PROPOSAL] 
 
However, WWF seems to have recently taken a stronger stance on the treaty issue since they now 
argue that the UNCLOS-based solution is no longer adequate because of climate change and claims 
by Arctic littoral States to extended continental shelf. The newly elected director of WWF Arctic, 
Dr. Hamilton, states, ‘We need a new approach, which includes thinking about a solid Arctic Treaty 
                                              
51 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 
December 1982 Relating to Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 
(New York, 4 August 1995). 
52 R. Hansson, ‘Climate Change, Energy and Governance in the Arctic’, PowerPoint presentation at a seminar organised 
by the Arctic Parliamentarians in Oslo (28 November 2005) (on file with the author). See also S. Smith, ‘Editorial’, 1 
WWF Arctic Bulletin (2004), 3,  available at <http://assets.panda.org/downloads/ab0104.pdf>. 
. 
and a multilateral governance body… This is the only way to ensure the implementation of 
sustainable development regimes and help the Arctic adapt to the severe impact of climate change 
and ultimately stabilize the world’s climate’53 
 
5. Evaluation and an Outline for an Arctic Treaty 
  
The proposed models for formalising Arctic co-operation now functioning under the Arctic Council 
are interesting in themselves as they manifest imaginative ideas in international legal thinking. Yet 
it also seems fairly clear that all of the above-reviewed proposals contain problems that make them 
vulnerable to criticism. However, there are bits and pieces in most of the proposals that certainly 
would lend themselves to use if and when an Arctic treaty is concluded in the near or mid-term 
future. 
 
Drawing inspiration from the ATS to design an Arctic treaty is problematic in many respects. First 
and foremost is the vast difference in the legal basis on which the two polar regimes have been 
created. The presence of territorial sovereigns in the Arctic does not allow much room to develop a 
collective model like the one in the ATS since it is precisely the non-presence of territorial 
sovereigns in the Antarctic that has enabled the creation of the present ATS. The other idea is to 
design an Arctic treaty on the basis of inspiration from the ATS, which is also hard to defend. The 
argument that international society, or at least a more extensive group of countries than the Arctic 
States (as in the Arctic Region Council proposal), would be able to conclude a comprehensive 
protection treaty for the Arctic seem extremely optimistic, given the presence of eight territorial 
sovereigns eagerly protecting and even trying to enlarge their jurisdictional domain. 
 
The focus on marine areas holds more promise, at least when the proposal in question is based on 
the present law of the sea as now mostly codified in the UNCLOS and related agreements. There is 
a clear tendency to perceive that the future reality in the Arctic is geared towards governing the 
Arctic waters, given the consequences of climate change and increased shipping, offshore 
hydrocarbon exploitation and fisheries in the region. If the focus of Arctic-wide co-operation 
eventually turns in this direction, there are plenty of already existing legal rules on which to base 
the regional marine approach in the Arctic. WWF Arctic’s proposal is particularly interesting as it 
                                              
53 See the press release on the WWF website at [PLEASE STATE THE TITLE OF PRESS RELEASE AND 
DOCUMENT NUMBER] 
<http://www.panda.org/about_wwf/where_we_work/europe/what_we_do/arctic/index.cfm?uNewsID=111440> (28 
August 2007). The press release was given on 17 August 2007. 
builds on the already existing Arctic Council structure and details an ambitious marine 
environmental protection regime, which would no doubt be viable from the viewpoint of making 
development in Arctic waters sustainable. Yet, at least in the near or even mid-term, such a change 
seems unlikely. First, at present it seems far too ambitious an approach, given the soft work that the 
Arctic Council is currently conducting. Second - and this criticism applies to all the proposals that 
focus on Arctic waters in designing an Arctic treaty - it would effectively transform the focus from 
the whole of the Arctic, including both terrestrial and marine environments, to its marine 
component. It can be convincingly argued that Finland and Sweden, the two Arctic Council 
members which do not have a coastline on Arctic waters, would not want Arctic-wide co-operation 
to move in this direction. Most of the proposals reviewed above, with the exception of that of WWF 
Arctic, also suffer from being distanced from the present Arctic-wide co-operation now functioning 
under the Arctic Council. 
 
It is unlikely that any major change in the present Arctic Council will take place in the short-term 
since Arctic-wide co-operation has developed incrementally, step-by-step, from the AEPS to the 
Arctic Council. Even though this co-operation has developed rather rapidly, the Council was 
intentionally built on the foundation of the AEPS. Like its predecessor, the Council has remained a 
soft-law creature, and the four environmental protection working-groups, the institution of Senior 
Arctic Officials and ministerial meetings, which were already part of the AEPS, have continued 
almost unchanged. Even the new Sustainable Development working group had a predecessor in the 
AEPS under the name of Task Force on Sustainable Development and Utilisation. However, the 
rules concerning participation, the decision-making procedure and the mandate of the process 
became more specific with the establishment of the Arctic Council, and it has since become more 
detailed in its organizational structure.54 
 
Importantly, the Arctic Council has become much more ambitious, especially in recent years, 
compared with the AEPS. This is mostly due to the fact that the working-groups, most of which 
began to function at the beginning of the 1990s, have only in recent years been able to deliver 
substantive suggestions and conduct important scientific investigations. Above all, the 
                                              
54 For example, the Arctic Council Rules of Procedure were adopted by the first ministerial conference of the Arctic 
Council in Iqaluit in 1998. The Arctic Council Rules of Procedure as adopted by the Arctic Council at the First Arctic 
Council Ministerial Meeting (Iqaluit, 18 September 1998)can be downloaded from the homepage of the Arctic Council 
(archives > founding documents) at <http://www.arctic-council.org>. The Rules of Procedure of the Arctic Council 
organize the work in the Council in a detailed and systematic manner, a state of affairs which was lacking in AEPS 
cooperation. The Rules cover topics such as how to convene different types of meetings under the Council, the 
launching process for programmes and projects, and the function of subordinate bodies. 
commissioning of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) by the Arctic Council, a massive 
scientific undertaking involving 300 scientists and experts in indigenous knowledge, has even 
challenged the present structure and status of the Arctic Council with its dramatic findings.55 
 
An argument can be made that by commissioning the ACIA, the Arctic Council has, in the language 
of resilience studies, created a resilience loop.56 According to the theoretical framework by an inter-
disciplinary group of resilience scholars, if the application of a governance arrangement does not 
meet its intended purpose - for example, a fisheries regime intended to sustain a certain fish stock - 
this may lead via social learning to either single-loop learning, correcting the strategies of a regime 
if the outcome is not achieved, or double-loop learning, that is, ‘correcting mismatches by first 
changing or supplementing existing values and norms, and then changing strategies or behaviour’.57 
The way to evaluate whether the intended goal has been achieved is scientific assessment: for 
instance, commissioning an investigation of the current sustainability of the stock, which, if the 
results show that the stock is depleted, might, in turn, lead to social learning by either changing the 
strategies or even revising the existing values and norms on which the governance arrangement is 
built. 
 
With the ACIA exposing the dramatic changes resulting from climate change to the Arctic 
environment, it is also possible to presume that climate change consequences call into question 
whether the Arctic Council should change its strategies, or even start reconsidering the basis of the 
regime, since, given the present structure and status of the Council, there is not much that it can do 
to contribute to mitigation of climate change; in particular, it is unable to make a positive 
contribution to the on-going process of ecological-social adaptation in the Arctic region to the 
consequences of climate change. 
 
                                              
55 The ten key findings of the ACIA Overview Report are as follows: i) the Arctic climate is now warming rapidly and 
much larger changes are projected; ii) Arctic warming and its consequences have worldwide implications; iii) Arctic 
vegetation zones are very likely to shift, causing wide-ranging impacts; iv) animal species' diversity, ranges and 
distribution will change; v) many coastal communities and facilities face increasing exposure to storms; vi) reduced sea 
ice is very likely to increase marine transport and access to resources; vii) thawing ground will disrupt transportation, 
buildings, and other infrastructure; viii) indigenous communities are facing major economic and cultural impacts; ix) 
elevated ultraviolet radiation levels will affect people, plants, and animals; and x) multiple influences will interact to 
cause increased impacts to people and ecosystems. See Impacts of a Warming Arctic: ACIA Overview Report 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004), at 10-11. 
56 The author realised this idea during discussions with Professor Nigel Bankes from the University of Calgary. 
57 A. Diduck, et al., ‘Unpacking Social Learning in Social-Ecological Systems: Case Studies of Polar Bear and Narwhal 
Management in Northern Canada’, in F. Berkes, et al., (eds) Breaking Ice: Renewable Resource and Ocean 
Management in the Canadian North (University of Calgary Press, 2005), 269, at 271-272. 
The release of the ACIA findings just before the 2004 Arctic Council ministerial in Reykjavik did 
point to some social learning processes starting in the Council. The ministers representing the eight 
Arctic States noted with concern the research results, committed themselves to transmit the 
information to all the relevant stake-holders, and encouraged Member States to take this 
information into account in mitigating and adapting to climate change. From the perspective of 
social learning, it was highly important that the ministers asked the SAOs [PLEASE SPELL THIS 
OUT] to report on the progress made in further organising the work of the Council and its 
subsidiary bodies in view of the ACIA findings.58 Norway, the current chair, has, in its programme 
for its 2006-2008 chair-period, stated that it will examine the Arctic Council’s organization with a 
view to improving its effectiveness and efficiency.59 Many connected ambitious assessments are 
now underway in the Council: for instance, to assess the state of hydrocarbon activities, shipping 
and biodiversity in light of the consequences of climate change in the region.60 In this way, the 
resilience loop shown by the ACIA can also serve as a catalyst for the Arctic Council to revise even 
its own fundamental elements, one of which is its legal status.61 
 
It is important to realise that the commonly heard argument that Arctic environmental problems 
come from outside, and thus need to be dealt with primarily in other forums,62 will gradually 
become less convincing when the consequences of Arctic climate change open up the region for 
various kinds of economic activities by Arctic and non-Arctic States and their residents and 
companies, with concomitant environmental problems for the region. It is this gradual shift to issues 
that can be managed by the Arctic States themselves that makes the creation of an Arctic treaty 
necessary. 
 
4.1. Outline for an Arctic Treaty  
 
                                              
58 The section entitled ‘Climate Change in the Arctic’ from the Reykjavik Declaration [PLEASE ADD THE FULL 
TITLE AND FULL DATE OF THE DECLARATION] can be downloaded from the website of the Arctic Council at 
<http://www.arctic-council.org/Meetings/Ministeral/2004/Reykjavik_Declaration.pdf>. 
59 The programme for the Norwegian 2006-2008 chairmanship can be downloaded at <http://www.arctic-
council.org/Default.htm> . 
60 For an analysis, see T. Koivurova and D. VanderZwaag, n. 15 above, at 162-173. 
61 Another development that manifests the ‘resilience gap’ in the Arctic Council, and induces us to think about the 
future status of the Council is the human rights petition whereby the Inuit of the US and Canada have asked the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights to declare that the US has breached many of their human rights through its 
irresponsible climate policy. The petition can be downloaded from the Earth Justice website at 
<http://www.earthjustice.org/news/press/007/inter-american-commission-on-human-rights-Hearing-on-Global-
Warming.html>.  
62 Compare this with, e.g., H. Corell, ‘Reflections on the Possibilities and Limitations of a Binding Legal Regime’, 37:4 
Environmental Policy and Law (2007), 321, at 322-323. 
The various processes by IUCN, WWF Arctic, UNEP Grid-Arendal and Arctic parliamentarians 
that have studied the possibility of an Arctic treaty have ended up with recommendations containing 
two features: an audit to assess the effectiveness and relevance of existing regimes as a basis for the 
second step, a discussion concerning the possibility of developing an Arctic treaty.63 In their August 
2006 meeting in Kiruna, the Conference of Arctic parliamentarians asked that their governments 
and the institutions of the European Union: 
 
In light of the impact of climate change, and the increasing economic and human 
activity, initiate, as a matter of urgency, an audit of existing legal regimes that impact 
the Arctic and to continue the discussion about strengthening or adding to them where 
necessary.64 
 
In a seminar co-hosted by UNEP Grid-Arendal and the Standing Committee of the Arctic 
Parliamentarians on Multilateral Agreements and Their Relevance to the Arctic in September 2006, 
the participants agreed on one overall recommendation: 
 
The participants of the Arendal Seminar recommend that UNEP, the Arctic 
Parliamentarians, the Arctic Council, the Nordic Council of Ministers, and 
Contracting Parties, governing bodies and secretariats to the MEAs [multilateral 
environmental agreements] support and cooperate on an audit to assess the 
effectiveness and relevance of MEAs in the Arctic and to examine the need and 
options for improving the existing regime as well as the need and options for 
developing an Arctic Treaty or Arctic Framework Convention. The audit should take 
into account recommendations from the Kiruna Conference of the Parliamentarians of 
the Arctic Region and the Arendal Seminar.65 
 
A similar conclusion was reached by the IUCN, which convened an expert meeting in Ottawa on 
24-25 March 2004 to discuss whether the ATS could provide the needed input for the development 
of environmental protection in the Arctic. The expert meeting was divided over the way 
environmental protection could and should be developed in the Arctic and whether a treaty 
approach was what was needed. The main approach to Arctic governance advanced at the meeting 
                                              
63 The only exception is the Nordic Council, which went further and adopted the following recommendation directed at 
the Nordic Council of Ministers: ‘The Nordic Council recommends to the Nordic Council of Ministers that in 
cooperation with the Arctic Council the aim is to create a legal system pertaining to the Arctic.’ See Pohjoiset 
merialueet käsittävästä oikeustieteellisestä tutkimuksesta ja Arktista koskevasta oikeusjärjestelmästä (In English: Legal 
Research pertaining to the Northern marine Regions and Arctic Legal Regime) (26 April 2006 decision) A 
1392/medborgar.[IS THIS THE DOCUMENT NUMBER?] 
64 See the report of the Seventh Conference of the Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, Kirkuna, Sweden, 2-4 August 
2006 (Recommendation No. 28, 4 August 2006),at 23, available at 
<http://www.arcticparl.org/resource/images/Arktiska_rapport_070125.pdf>. 
65 See Report on Recommendations from the Adrenal Seminar on Multilateral Environmental Agreements and their 
Relevance to the Arctic, Adrenal, Norway, 21-22 September 2006 (Adrenal , 22 September 2006), at 2, available at   
<http://polar.grida.no/_documents/mea_recommendations.pdf>. 
was not to borrow from the Antarctic experience but to first study which environmental threats to 
the Arctic should be addressed at which level: i.e., universal (global treaties and processes), regional 
(the Arctic Council), bilateral, national and sub-national.66  
 
Hence, there clearly seems to be pressure from various observers of the Arctic Council to at least 
examine the applicable treaties carefully, studying in particular how these treaties are implemented 
in the region and whether, on the basis of that analysis, an integrated Arctic treaty approach is 
called for. What these actions by observers of the Arctic Council serve to demonstrate is that 
pressures are building to adopt a treaty approach. 
 
In the mid-term perspective, it seems evident that the consequences of climate change in particular 
will press the Council to turn to the issue of a treaty since, with its present status as a soft-law 
forum,67 commissioning assessments and even providing soft guidance in some cases, it can do 
little to induce sustainability in the region. The ACIA and other assessments of the Council’s 
working groups will bring increasing pressure to formalise the co-operation, which may lead to real 
discussions about whether a treaty approach should be chosen for the Arctic. This internal process 
within the Arctic Council organs will likely prompt the negotiation process more than pressure from 
the observers (such as IUCN, WWF or the Arctic parliamentarians) of the Council. If the observers 
can push the audit to be commissioned by the Council, this will clearly speed up the internal process 
within the Arctic Council. 
 
If this internal process in the Council leads to a treaty approach, it is possible to foresee a process of 
formalisation building on the present structure of the Council. One possible way forward is to 
choose a framework treaty which formalises the current membership and decision-making 
procedure of the Council, adds certain guiding principles related to environmental protection and 
sustainable development to the treaty, and gives a mandate to the Council to adopt protocols to 
counter threats to environmental protection and challenges to sustainable development on the basis 
of scientific assessment. The reason for adopting a framework treaty is that it would provide the 
shortest possible time-frame for adopting a treaty approach, since it would not require substantial 
                                              
66 See W.E. Burhenne, ‘The Arctic: Towards a New Environmental Regime?’, 37:2/3 Environmental Policy and Law 
(2007), 249-256, at 255. 
67 The possible benefits of establishing a treaty include encouraging greater political and bureaucratic commitments, 
establishing firmer institutional and financial foundations, transcending the vagaries of changing governmental 
viewpoints and shifting personnel, giving ‘legal teeth’ to environmental principles and standards, and raising the public 
profile of regional challenges and cooperation needs. For an overview of the pros and cons of the treaty approach, see T. 
Koivurova and D. VanderZwaag, n. 15 above, at 178-180.  
changes to the present structure and thus would shorten the time needed to achieve consensus in the 
negotiations. It would also leave doors open to enter into substantive regulation via protocols when 
the time is ripe; in this regard the already existing treaty and customary law norms applicable to the 
Arctic States provide a good starting-point. The protocols can thus serve in many cases as regional 
implementation treaties of more general conventions, and if treaties are not available or apply only 
to some Arctic States, independent protocols can be opted for. Good suggestions for the content of 
individual proposals have already come from WWF Arctic and the studies of Nowlan68 and 
Rayfuse.69 
 
The treaty should formalise much of what already exists and contain the standard non-mandatory 
dispute-resolution provision to the effect that States must peacefully resolve their disputes with 
mechanisms of their own choosing. Many of the other standard provisions found in treaties 
concerning termination, withdrawal, and so forth should not be articulated, as they are governed by 
the customary law of treaties; the raising of these issues would pose delicate and time-consuming 
problems in negotiations, which could take years to resolve. Issues such as liability and mandatory 
dispute-resolution would be best left fully out of the framework treaty, allowing the political will to 
resolve these issues to develop.  
 
Of vast importance would be the re-structuring of the work of the six working-groups of the 
Council in order to ensure that scientific information/traditional knowledge flows in an integrated 
and effective way to the Council, creating pressure to adopt protocols to the framework treaty. 
Currently, almost all the working groups conduct their own assessments, although the AMAP 
programme is the key working group in this field. In order to ensure an integrated flow of scientific 
information/traditional knowledge to the Council, which has also been proposed by WWF Arctic,70 
AMAP should be given a clearer role as the scientific assessment body of the Council, while the 
other working groups could focus more on policy response strategies on the basis of this 
information/traditional knowledge. This sort of re-organisation of the tasks of the working groups 
was contemplated in 2006 by the then incoming chair Norway when it circulated a short paper on 
the reform of the Arctic Council, in particular on how the tasks of the existing working groups 
should be re-organised, proposing: 
 
                                              
68 See L. Nowlan, n. 37 above. 
69 See R. Rayfuse, n. 40 above. 
70 See R. Hansson, n. 52 above. 
1. a group to monitor and assess the Arctic environment and ecosystems (AMAP and part of 
CAFF); 
2. an Environmental Action Group to implement practical action (PAME, ACAP, EPPR and part of 
CAFF); 
3. an Economic group (part of SDWG); and 
4. a Social and Cultural group (part of SDWG).71 
 
An especially important point would be to institutionalise the updating of the ACIA within the 
AMAP programme, in a format similar to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change’speriodic assessments. In fact, the so-called focal point process to implement the Reykjavik 
ministerial decisions made on the basis of the ACIA has been initiated by the Council, but the 
current chair (Norway) has pointed out that the measures taken so far are not sufficient.72 The 
ACIA should, however, be re-focused to better cover how the Arctic governance systems and 
human communities are impacted by climate change, and how their adaptive capacity could be 
enhanced, since the main focus has been on natural sciences.73 The baseline for these social 
assessments was created with the Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR) undertaken during 
the Iceland’s period as chair from 2002-2004.74 
 
If this kind of framework treaty approach is adopted, the difficult questions of permanent funding 
and a secretariat must be confronted. The importance of having an independent staff dedicated to 
Arctic interests cannot be overstated, and the current chair (Norway) has already taken the first 
steps in this direction by establishing, together with the next chairs, Denmark and Sweden, a 
secretariat for the Council until the end of 2012.75 The secretariat, if properly staffed and financed, 
could also assume the task of co-ordinating the implementation of existing treaties applicable in the 
Arctic. 
 
                                              
71 Summarised in Arctic Athabascan Council, ‘Improving the Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Arctic Council: A 
Discussion Paper’ (presented at the SAO meeting in Troms, Norway (April 12-13, 2007)). The paper can be 
downloaded from the Arctic Council’s website (meetings > Senior Arctic Officials > 2007) at <http://www.arctic-
council.org/>. 
72 ‘Paper prepared by Norway on the topic of revising the Arctic Council Focal Point, Draft Text for a discussion paper 
on the future of the Focal Point for ACIA Follow-up at the upcoming Focal Point meeting’, in Report to SAOs from 
Focal Point for ACIA Follow-up Activities (Arctic Council, 2006), Annex 8, which can be downloaded from the Arctic 
Council website (meetings > ministerial meetings > 2006), at <http://www.arctic-council.org/>. 
73 See generally, the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment Final Scientific Report (Cambridge University Press, 2005).  
74 See Arctic Human Development Report, n. 8 above.  
75 See ‘Common objectives and priorities for the Norwegian, Danish and Swedish chairmanships of the Arctic Council 
(2006-2012)’ (Arctic Council, 2006), available at <http://www.arctic-
council.org/News/Formannskapsprogram_ArcticCouncil.pdf>. 
One of the greatest concerns in moving towards an Arctic treaty is the possibility that the status of 
the organisations of Arctic indigenous peoples might be called into question. As will be recalled, 
they are not NGOs in the work of the Arctic Council, but participate on an equal footing in the work 
of the Council, from ministerial meetings down to individual working groups. Even though the 
decisions will be made by the Arctic States, these decisions can only be made after full consultation 
with the six Arctic indigenous peoples’ organisations, which possess the status of permanent 
participants.76 In reality, this has meant that if all six permanent participants object to a certain 
project or decision, it will not proceed to the stage of decision-making.77 It is questionable whether 
the status of the indigenous peoples’ organisations can be retained if the above-outlined treaty is 
negotiated, since in almost all other inter-governmental organisations, regimes and negotiation 
processes, the status of indigenous peoples is only that of an NGO, with concomitant observer 
status. 
 
It should be emphasised that the danger of downgrading the status of the indigenous people’s 
organisations and lessening their general influence in decision-making is not due to constraints laid 
down by the customary law of treaties. According to that body of law, States are perfectly free to 
create a treaty that permits the participation of indigenous peoples as permanent participants since 
they are not accorded actual decision-making power, but must only be fully consulted before 
decision-making by the member States. Indeed, the biggest obstacle to establishing participatory 
rights for indigenous peoples in an Arctic treaty would arise from the factual setting. When an 
international treaty is concluded, different officials are involved than in the creation of a soft-law 
instrument. Foreign ministries and their legal offices would be involved, and their views might 
result in indigenous peoples’ being given the status they normally have in international treaty 
negotiations or inter-governmental organisations: that of an NGO. Another possible obstacle would 
be the involvement of national parliaments, which normally have some kind of power over treaty-
making, a fact that also poses a challenge to the position of indigenous peoples. If the Arctic 
indigenous peoples’ organisations were downgraded to the status of observers, with the usual NGO 
status, this would have unfortunate consequences for the whole Arctic co-operation process, 
especially its environmental protection mandate. This is not only because of the importance of these 
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organisations in the environmental and sustainable development work carried out in the Council, 
which has been substantial, as they have been able to convey their views on how environmental 
protection should be carried out in an area in which indigenous people have lived sustainably for 
ages. Indigenous organisations have also made a distinct contribution in providing their traditional 
knowledge to make the Arctic Council’s scientific assessments even more compelling for the 
general public and decision-makers.78 
 
If we think of future possibilities to create an Arctic treaty with a stronger environmental protection 
mandate, retaining the status of indigenous peoples in the formalised Arctic Council is essential. 
First, the status given to Arctic indigenous peoples legitimises the work of the Arctic Council as 
truly representing the people who live there, the original occupants of the region. Second, 
irrespective of whether all Arctic indigenous peoples still live in a sustainable way in a close 
relationship with their environment, this popular image is conveyed in international forums and in 
the public eye. This has a vast significance from the perspective of legitimising the environmental 
protection mandate of the Council, as it can and must present itself as safeguarding this special 
relationship with the still relatively undisturbed environment of the Arctic indigenous peoples. 
These reasons alone speak volumes for retaining the status of indigenous peoples if and when an 
Arctic treaty is negotiated. 
  
The process of negotiating the framework convention should ideally be initiated by one or more of 
the members of the Arctic Council, or its six permanent participants. Many of the proposals for an 
Arctic treaty reviewed above do not build on what is already in existence: the Arctic Council, which 
is a direct outgrowth of the AEPS. The proposal advanced here differs fundamentally from most of 
the other proposals since it focuses on formalising the present structure of the Arctic Council with 
minor additions. Even the WWF’s preliminary proposal, which rightly builds on the existing Arctic 
Council structure, differs greatly from the proposal advanced here. For the present author, it seems 
too ambitious to aim for negotiations to conclude far-reaching protocols on environmental 
protection as in the proposal laid out by WWF Arctic. A more realistic goal is to try to establish a 
framework convention, which could, in time, with increasing scientific knowledge of climate 
change consequences in the region, form the basis for adopting protocols on various environmental 
policy areas. WWF Arctic’s proposal also does not sufficiently take into account the other policy 
                                              
78 For an analysis see, e.g., L-O. Reiersen, S. Wilson, and V. Kimstack, ‘Circumpolar Perspectives on Persistent 
Organic Pollutants: The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme’, in D.L. Downie and T. Fenge (eds) Northern 
Lights Against POPs: Combating Toxic Threats in the Arctic (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003). 
area of the Council, sustainable development, and its proposal focuses too heavily on Arctic waters, 
which may be unacceptable to Finland and Sweden, which do not have Arctic coastlines. 
 
Even though pressure to formalise the Arctic co-operation now functioning under the Arctic 
Council is building up, it is clear that there are many obstacles to negotiating an Arctic framework 
convention, the adoption of which is more pressing day by day. If the Arctic Council continues 
without a legal mandate, there is a great danger of it becoming a façade under which unilateral and 
uncoordinated development-oriented policies of the States in the region can proceed; a scenario 
which already dominates much of the development in the Arctic. By exposing the vulnerability of 
the Arctic human and ecological systems to the consequences of climate change and economic 
globalisation, the various scientific assessments commissioned by the Council are likely, in time, to 
induce social learning within the Council which, it is to be hoped, will lead to serious discussions 
concerning the possibility of creating an Arctic framework treaty. 
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